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PRIVATISATION FOR POVERTY REDUCTION?  
THE CASE OF BANGLADESH1 
        By Hulya Dagdeviren 
 
 
The shift in the last two decades from a state-led to a market oriented 
development strategy in most of the developing countries under the directions of the 
World Bank and the IMF has had its repercussions on policy making for poverty 
reduction. The role of the state has been redefined both in terms of its stance in ‘the 
market’ and the ways in which it intervened in the process of redistribution.  
In the meantime, the concern over the persistence and/or rise of poverty in many 
LDCs and transition economies in the 1980s and 1990s led various parties to reconsider 
the relationship between economic policies and social objectives. The two major actors 
of policy making in developing world, i.e. the World Bank and the IMF, revised the nature 
of their policy conditional lending. The primary focus on stabilization and structural 
adjustment (SSA) shifted in a seemingly significant way to a strategy of poverty 
reduction. SSA packages have been replaced by the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs) after the late 1990s. Although the latter were designed by the governments in 
each country, they, in many ways, encompassed the standard SSA policies.  
Invariably, poverty reduction strategy papers of individual economies included 
privatisation of state owned enterprises (SOEs) as an essential component of the 
poverty reduction process. SOEs have been viewed to be draining the resources of the 
nations (because of overstaffing, excessive budgetary support, loss making and 
inefficiency) which can be more productively used for crucial social purposes e.g. 
poverty reduction. 
In this paper, we aim to revisit the process of privatisation with a view to explore 
its implications for poverty reduction in the context of a low-income country, namely 
Bangladesh. The first part presents an overview of the issues with respect to 
privatization in general terms. The subsequent sections evaluate the process of 
privatization in Bangladesh in view of its impact on employment, revenue generation and 
efficiency.  
 
                                                 
1 The research for this paper was carried out during my stay in Dhaka in the Summer of 2002 for a wider 
programme on the Macroeconomics of Poverty Reduction in Asia-Pacific which was commissioned and 
partly financed by the United Nations Development Fund. 
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AN OVERVIEW  
 
Poverty reduction in developing world until 1980s was, most often implicitly, tied 
to the overall economic development strategy. Higher and faster industrial growth  
through import substitution was a prominent feature of that strategy with states taking up 
the leading role in the process. The existence and expansion of state owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in these economies were justified on the basis of various objectives including 
eliminating of market failures, supporting economic development where private sector 
was rather weak and redistributing of income to reduce poverty and inequalities.   
Widespread privatisations in the developing world have become a part of the 
liberalisation process which marked the shift in the development paradigm from the early 
1980s onwards. The rationale this time was ‘the inefficiency’ of SOEs which deteriorated 
the growth prospects. The distributional and social welfare consequences of privatization 
have been largely overshadowed by almost an exclusive focus on efficiency. Departing 
from this, advocates of privatization outlined how expected increase in efficiency would 
lead to faster growth and supposedly a better social outcome. Public revenues  covering 
the losses of the SOEs together with the sales revenues generated through privatization 
is expected to generate resources for poverty reducing social projects.  
The problem is even if privatization leads to efficiency gains (though this is 
ambiguous, too) or positive revenue gains, would these automatically be translated into 
poverty reduction? Answering this question requires us not only to analyse the nature of 
these gains (i.e. do they lead to ‘pro-poor’ growth) but also the distributional 
consequences of privatization. On the latter, there has been surprisingly little research 
up until recent times. Ramanadham (1995), Hoeven and Sziracki (1998), Chisari, 
Estache and Romero (1997), Macedo (2000), Birdsall and Nellis (2002) are some to 
mention. A valuable contribution of these papers is the articulation of the fact that there 
are winners and losers in the process of privatisation. Under certain circumstances (e.g. 
lack of a regulatory framework, the strategy and form of privatisation), the population in 
the latter category is thought to be increasing.  
In this paper, our evaluation is based on the framework that the impact of 
privatisation on growth and distribution (hence poverty) can be assessed through its 
effect on 
i. efficiency in production2  
ii. employment 
iii. revenue generation for government 
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iv. change in the prices and quality of goods and services   
 
One has to note that even if all these elements from (i) to (iv) see a positive 
change (e.g. generation of large revenues through privatisation), this in itself does not 
ensure a positive knock on effect on poverty levels. In general, the net effect does not 
only depend on the nature of the change in these indicators (i.e. negative or positive) but 
also on the extent to which the benefits are either directly shared by the poor or used for 
purposes conducive to poverty reduction. 
The net distributional outcome for beneficiaries/losers would be a product of the 
trade-offs taking place through various channels. For instance, if privatisation is 
accompanied by an increase in output prices this would be a loss for consumers but a 
gain to the new producer. Similarly, while redundancies or retrenchment of workers 
during or after privatisation imply a serious loss for the workers and their dependents, it 
may benefit the investors of the divested enterprise through efficiency gains in 
production and increase in profitability.  
Finally, the long-term outcomes may fundamentally be different from those of the 
short term and the medium term. For instance, divestment of SOEs may result in 
substantial retrenchments initially. In the medium to longer term, this negative outcome 
may be counterbalanced with increased employment following a rise in labour 
productivity and profitability leading to employment generating investment.  
In what follows, the case of privatization in Bangladesh is presented with a focus 
on its implications for poverty reduction. Three important dimensions of privatization are 
examined for this purpose: its revenue generation, employment and efficiency impact.  
 
 
THE CASE OF BANGLADESH  
 
 Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries in Asia. Although some progress has 
been achieved over the years in reducing poverty levels, the current state of social well-
being is far from satisfactory. The most recent estimates show that national poverty level 
in Bangladesh is close to 45 per cent with rural poverty levels being even higher than the 
national average (See, Table 1 below).3 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 This would be tied to the change in market structure  and incentives under different forms of 
ownership. 
3 Note that the draft poverty reduction strategy paper for Bangladesh (published by the Ministry of Finance 
in April 2002) reports a higher poverty incidence at national level (49.8 per cent) and lower one for urban 
areas (36.6 per cent). 
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Table 1. The Extent of Poverty in Bangladesh (Head-count Ratios) 
  
National 
 
Rural Poverty 
 
Urban Poverty 
 
Bangladesh (1) 
 
44.3 52.5 42.3 
(1) Bangladesh Household Income & Expenditure Survey (2000) 
 
 
While elimination of poverty in many developing countries was tied to the overall 
growth strategy on the basis of state-led industrialisation, Bangladesh did not have a 
similar history in this respect. Partly because countries like India went through a 
relatively successful period of state-led industrialisation for about three decades since 
the 1950s and created a substantial productive capacity. On the other hand, the state in 
Bangladesh became the de facto owner of a large number of enterprises after 
independence in 1971. This was when SOEs elsewhere were beginning to encounter 
the greatest challenges due to the adverse effects of the oil crisis, global recession and 
rising indebtedness and, therefore, beginning to consider ways of restructuring. Partly as 
a result of this, a wave of denationalisation begun in Bangladesh shortly after the 
nationalisation of the so called ‘abondoned enterprises’. This was followed by the most 
rapid divestment of SOEs initiated under the military government of General Ershad from 
1982 to 1986. In this period, the share of the public sector in total industrial assets was 
more than halved. 4 There has been a significant slow down in this pace in the late 
1980s and during the 1990s. While divestment has been meagre in the last decade, the 
commitment to withdraw public sector from real productive activities, especially from the 
manufacturing sector, has been maintained by ceasing its expansion in the industry. The 
share of public sector in the industry both in terms of employment and output declined 
from around 70 per cent to 10 per cent. 
There are several characteristics of privatisation process in Bangladesh. First of 
all, there has been limited debate on this issue because of the nature of the political 
regime in the 1980s. The absence of debate may seem like a trivial issue. In reality, it 
may make a serious difference. For instance, a lively debate on privatisation has been 
pursued in India since the 1980s and various types of SOE reforms, including 
privatisation, has been considered. The use of performance contracts,5 efforts to 
increase the autonomy of management, removal of price controls for SOE products, 
                                                 
4 See Humphrey (1990) for an overview of privatisation in Bangladesh in the 1970s and 1980s.  
5 the so called ‘memoranda of understanding’ or MOUs 
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among many other measures, have significantly improved the overall performance of 
SOEs in the last decade (see, S. K. Goyal, 2000).  
Secondly, the main of form of privatisation in Bangladesh has been block sales / 
wholesale divestment. Thirdly, majority of the divested SOEs were small scale and loss 
making industrial units (especially jute and textile mills). Finally, investors in Bangladesh 
have been free from conditions laid by the authorities unlike other countries like India 
where the purchase agreement would contain some key obligations for the investor (e.g. 
new investment, time restrictions on re-sale of shares and constraints on labour 
retrenchment).  
 
 
Privatisation and its impact on employment 
 
Privatisation is often accompanied by large-scale cuts in employment6 which 
produce one of the most adverse outcomes that immediately affect the livelihoods of 
those who are made redundant. The influence of lay offs on poverty is likely to be more 
severe in low-income countries like Bangladesh where there are no provisions of social 
security (e.g. unemployment or income support). Among the affected households, those 
with limited other sources of income are most likely to fall below the poverty line after 
redundancies. Opportunities for and constraints on re-entering the labour market would 
be another factor that determines the scale of adversities and impact on poverty.  
The scale of redundancies in the process of privatisation has been substantial in 
South Asia in general and in Bangladesh in particular, as given in Table 2. Note that it is 
not only the size of labour shedding but also the form of labour shedding that is 
important. Labour restructuring in Bangladesh was, mostly, in the form of retrenchments 
which pose more insecurity both in terms of income and other benefits (e.g. medical 
care). On the other hand, redundancies in India, though has been massive, mostly took 
the form of voluntary retirement, which has less severe implications. The cumulative 
retrenchments account for about 15 per cent of total manufacturing employment in 
Bangladesh. The older workers with long years of service are likely to be hit worst as 
loss of income is not the only adversity for them. The insecurity they may have to face as 
a result of losing the work related benefits such as medical coverage, which would make 
a crucial difference to the quality of their life, and the entitlement to a retirement income 
–assuming that they would be the most disadvantaged in finding a new employment 
                                                 
6 See, Kikeri (1998) for an overview of the redundancies in the developing world. 
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opportunity– poses a moral question that cannot be solved on the basis of pure 
economic reasoning.  
 
Table 2. Redundancies Resulting from Privatisation in South Asia 
  SOE employment Redundancy (1) (per cent) Retrenchment costs 
Bangladesh 240 thousand 25 TK 7 billion 
India 9.8 million 23a Rs. 48,092 billion 
Pakistan 34.6 thousand 63a Rs. 3,559 million 
Source: Joshi (2000)  
(1) percentage of labour force in privatized enterprises  a voluntary retirement  
   
 
The prevention of the welfare loss and/or poverty among the effected households 
depends heavily on measures taken by the government. The main dilemma here, 
however, is that once appropriate measures are put in place, the cost of privatization 
may outweigh its immediate benefits. This is point is made obvious by the data in Table 
4 which illustrate that the cost of compensation of workers, is expected to be more than 
10 times the sale revenues to be generated through privatisation.  
Under the most current scheme known as ‘the golden handshake’, compensation 
offered to redundant workers varies with their service years. For instance, a worker with 
10 years of service is entitled to a gratuity payment equivalent to 20 months salary plus 
an additional payment which again varies with the service years. Although the 
compensation offered to the laid off workers has improved over time in Bangladesh, it is 
still far from adequate, especially, when new employment opportunities are limited. The 
participatory review initiative of structural adjustment in Bangladesh revealed that: 
‘a great many retrenched workers are yet to be paid the benefits of the 
much vaunted golden handshake … those who received the money failed 
to put the amount in productive ventures… hundreds of them [retrenched 
workers] have died without medical attention.’  (Bhattacharya and Titumir, 
2001, pp. 169 and 206) 
What happens to the remaining workers? How is their welfare affected after 
privatisation? There is ample evidence from the developing world that increased 
flexibility after privatisation has increased the insecurity of workers. See,  Van der 
Hoeven and Sziraczki (1997). The experience in Bangladesh has been similar as 
demonstrated by Bhaskar and Khan (1995) who found that among the mills privatised 
between 1983-1986 the reduction in the number of permanent workers was traded off by 
an increase in casual workforce with poorer terms and conditions of employment 
contracts. 
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On the other hand, we cannot deny the possibility that labour force restructuring 
during privatisation may produce efficiency gains and increase profitability. It is well 
documented that many SOEs in many developing economies operate with substantial 
excess workforce. Yet, there is no guarantee that firm specific efficiency gains after 
divestment, if any, may be translated into economy wide gains. When laid off workers 
remain unemployed for prolonged periods because of lack of employment opportunities, 
the economy wide impact of labour shedding would be increased unemployment, 
reverse multiplier effect induced by the reduced wage bill,7 and loss of welfare for the 
households affected with the possibility of increased poverty. What we suggest, 
therefore, is that a proper accounting of the distribution of gains and losses associated 
with sizeable labour cuts has to be made and policies should be chosen accordingly 
without allowing for outright inefficient use of resources. 
 
 
Revenue generation through divestment 
 
Revenue generation and its use for social purposes underlie almost all of the 
objectives of privatisation policy in Bangladesh.8 The success of the implementation can 
be evaluated, therefore, by the level of net revenues generated through divestment and 
the extent to which they are used for poverty reduction. There are three dimensions to 
revenue generation through divestment. These are the sale income net of cost of 
privatisation (e.g. administrative cost, compensation of employees), profits foregone or 
losses unloaded of SOEs and change in the tax revenues after privatisation. Of these, 
sale income associated with each divestment have to be considered as a one-off 
gain/loss while the latter two are of long-term character as long as enterprises continue 
to exist after privatisation. As mentioned before, even if privatisation generates extra 
funds for the state both in the short and the long term, this does not imply an 
improvement on the poverty front unless they are invested in areas that are conducive to 
poverty reduction (e.g. investment generating employment, creating infrastructure and 
improving health and education for the poor). 
Gross revenue generation in Bangladesh has been rather dismal in spite of the 
large number of units involved in privatisation as shown in Table 3 below. The primary 
reason for this is that the privatisation has been more or less confined to the relatively 
smaller, loss making labour intensive manufacturing units operating under more 
                                                 
7 assuming that marginal propensity to consume for workers is much higher  
8 See, Privatisation Policy of Government of Bangladesh (2001). 
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competitive market conditions with substantial debts such as textile and jute mills.9 
Under these conditions, there has been a serious lack of interest on investors’ part. In 
addition, privatisation of quite a large number of mills took the form of denationalisation 
which involved returning these units to their previous owners.   
 
Table 3. Privatisation Revenues in South Asia  (up to 1999) 
 Revenues  
(US$ Millions) 
Number of 
Companies  
Privatized 
FDI from 
Privatisation 
(US$ Millions) 
Bangladesh 60 1083(*) 0 
India 8983 78 1547 
Nepal 13 10 1 
Pakistan 1,993 106 939 
Sri Lanka 807 75 408 
Source: World Bank (2000) Development Economics Prospects Group10  
(*) Joshi (2000) 
 
Gross privatisation revenues from 1982 to 1998, at most, constituted 1.5 per cent of total 
government expenditure in the best years like 1983 and 1993. For most other years it was no 
more than 0.3 per cent of total government expenditure.11 What these estimates indicate is that 
even assuming the most unlikely case that these were net proceeds and they were utilized 
entirely for poverty reduction, the impact is likely to be insignificant especially if they are 
unsustainable. Besides, the Privatisation Act 2000 states that the priority in using the proceeds of 
privatisation will be given to meeting the outstanding loans and liabilities of the respective 
enterprise. 
Revenues net of administrative and restructuring costs is likely to be much 
meagre, perhaps even negative, than the gross figures. The compensation package for the 
retrenched employees is the largest cost in the case of Bangladesh for the divestments 
planned for the future.  For instance, Table 4 below gives estimated sale revenues and the 
cost of compensation involving the companies that are planned to be divested during 
2002-2003 fiscal year. What it shows is that the cost of compensation for redundancies 
alone is estimated to be more than ten times the net recoverable sale revenue.  
If one includes other costs such as cost of converting current debts into long-term 
debts and the administrative costs, privatisation seems to be levying a substantial 
                                                 
9 In general, revenue generation through divestment of SOEs with natural monopoly characteristics (as in 
utilities) is known to be much larger; and this has been absent in Bangladesh.  
10 The database is accessible from (www.ipanet.net/documents/WorldBank/databases/plink/)  
11 Estimated by using Government Expenditure figures from the Yearbooks of Bangladesh Bureau of 
Statistics.  Privatisation revenues for 1983 and 1984 are given in Humphrey (1991), those for 1989 to 1998 
are from World Bank Privatisation Database. 
 10
burden on the government. For instance, although long-term liabilities are transferred to 
the buyer, they are deducted from the total sale price. The reduction in the expected sale 
price due to the indebtedness of these enterprises for the enterprises to be divested in 
2002-2003 varies between 43 and 67 per cent. The average reduction is 38 per cent 
(see Table 4 above). Moreover, the investors purchasing the enterprise are provided 
with a long-term debt by the state to pay off the current debts. In addition, they are 
entitled to a maximum rebate of 40 per cent from the sale price provided that they pay all 
the dues within 30 days in foreign exchange. These concessions together with other 
costs suggest that privatisation has imposed substantial costs on the public sector, let 
alone generate revenue.   
 
Table 4. Enterprises to be divested during 2002-2003 Fiscal Year (Lac Taka) 
 
Estimated  
Sale Revenue 
(Gross) 
Estimated  
Sale Revenue  
(net of Long-term Loans) 
No. of 
Retrenchments 
Estimated Severance 
Payment  
12,205 4,678 21,771 49,359 
Source: Monitoring Cell, Ministry of Finance  
 
 
The next question is the size of funds that may be released after privatization as 
the public sector would no longer be liable for financing the deficits of SOEs. In 
Bangladesh, SOEs have been consistently loss making since the mid 1980s except for a 
few years. Although these losses can be considered marginal for some years, their size 
has been considerably large for many other years. According to Table 5, net SOE losses 
have been 2 per cent of total government expenditure on average during 1990-2000 and 
much higher for some individual years. The losses of the manufacturing SOEs are the 
primary source of these aggregate losses.  
Several questions can be raised about this picture. The foremost is, of course, 
the implication of eliminating these losses through divestiture for the poor. Without 
appropriate policies in place, the released funds may be used to subsidize the rich in the 
name of promoting the private sector’s participation etc. 
 
Table 5. The Ratio of Net SOE Profits (Losses) to Government Expenditure 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
(6.38) (5.34) 8.24 (2.79) 0.18 (2.18) (0.16) (4.87) (1.07) (1.34) (5.78)
Source: Monitoring Cell, Ministry of Finance and BBS Yearbooks 
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Second, are the causes of loss making in public enterprises. Addressing this 
question requires us to discuss the three possible sources of loss making:  
a) Are SOEs inherently inefficient which leads to them to incur losses? 
b) Are there economy-wide structural factors that contribute to their loss making? 
c) What is the role of the quasi-fiscal responsibilities of SOEs in their loss making?  
Although the first two points are the subject of the next section, let us make a 
start on these here. One of the most popular arguments against public ownership is the 
theory of ‘rent-seeking’ (Krueger, 1974) and corruption. When the source of loss making 
is the corrupt practices of the public officials causing inefficiency, those outside the circle 
of corruption would lose including those living under poverty. The issue, however, is 
whether or not privatisation brings an end to rent-seeking and corruption. The 
experience in Eastern Europe and especially in Russia12 as well as the incidents of 
corruption that hit the surface in the US in the recent years suggest otherwise. Neither 
privatization eliminates rent-seeking and corruption (and perhaps increases it under 
certain circumstances) nor countries with strong private sectors are free from them.  
Loss making due to economy wide factors (e.g. lack of infrastucture, skills etc.) is 
likely to remain under private ownership. More importantly, if a component of SOE 
losses emerges because of the quasi-fiscal role of the SOEs, certain sectors and social 
groups including the poor may be losing the subsidies provided through SOEs as a 
result of divestiture.  
To make this final point more concrete, let us take the example of Bangladesh 
Chemical Industries Corporations (BCIC) which is a public sector company and has the 
monopoly over urea (a type of fertilizer) production.  Urea prices by BCIC were about 45 
per cent below import parity price on average during 1990-2002 according to a World 
Bank study. As shown in Table 6, total annual subsidy varied from a minimum of around 
3 billion to a maximum of 14 billion taka between 1991 and 2000.  
 
Table 6. Total Subsidy on Urea and the Performance of BCIC (billion taka)  
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Total Subsidy on Urea 5 6.1 4.8 5 12.8 13.9 11.7 4.9 2.7 3.7 
Net profit/loss of BCIC -0.34 -0.55 0.21 0.25 -0.75 -1.21 -2.38 -0.67 -1.42 -1.50 
Profits without subsidy 13 4.66 5.55 5.01 5.25 12.05 12.69 9.32 4.23 1.28 2.20 
Source: World Bank (2002) 
 
 
Once these subsidies are taken into account, the net losses of BCIC are converted into 
substantial amounts of net profits. The subsidized sales of SOEs to various sectors do 
                                                 
12 See, for instance, Stiglitz (2002)  
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not only affect their financial performance but they also have implications for the overall 
economic growth and distribution since they effectively represent a transfer from public 
to private sector. 
How might these subsidies be affecting the poor? Bangladesh is a country where 
about 63 per cent of the active labour force was involved in agricultural production and 
about 75 per cent of the population lived in the rural sector in the year 2000. According 
to the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (2000), the headcount ratio for rural 
poverty was 52.5 per cent in 2000. If we associate land holding with farming and use of 
urea, the subsidy on urea is likely to be benefiting a large proportion of small and 
marginal landholders. This is because the concentration of land holding is not very high 
in Bangladesh. Only about 20 per cent of households at national level own land greater 
than 1.5 acres (HES, 1995-96). About 10 percent of households are landless. The 
remaining are small and marginal landowners who are likely to be benefiting from the 
subsidy in varying degrees.  
Bangladesh is fortunate to have large natural gas reserves which allows the 
SOEs to provide fertiliser to farmers at significantly subsidized prices. Divestment of 
enterprises involved in urea production under BCIC may imply that subsidies are 
eliminated or they are reduced significantly, leading to a redistribution of income towards 
the new owners in the form of increased profits. What would be the impact of such 
changes on poverty? One possibility is the increase in land concentration rate if the rise 
in the price of fertilizer is such that the small and marginal landholders are driven out of 
farming. The implication is that if those affected households are already among the non-
poor they may fall into poverty or extreme poverty.  A second possibility is that the 
general decline in the use of fertiliser associated with price increases may not only push 
some households below poverty line or extreme poverty conditions but it may also 
threaten the national food security. The welfare of the non-farming communities and 
urban population may also be negatively affected by the higher cost of agricultural 
production and higher prices for basic food-stuff. 
Overall, the impact of privatisation on poverty with respect to the role of subsidies 
is likely to depend on the line production and service being privatised. While there may 
be a direct link between poverty and privatisation of firms producing, say, fertiliser, in 
other areas the adverse outcomes may not be felt by the poor if they were not the users 
of the goods and services produced by SOEs prior to privatization. Even in this case, 
there may be a rational for subsidies to exist if they play a vital role in the growth and 
development of some industries.  
                                                                                                                                                 
13 Note that this estimate does not include the subsidy to BCIC provided by BOGMC through under priced 
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Another line of argument would be that provision of subsidies can be maintained 
even after privatization through budgetary allocation. The dilemma, here is posed by the 
fact that the low income economies are already seriously constrained by the lack of 
capacity in revenue generation and by the tight fiscal stance they are required to follow. 
Given that poverty is a widespread phenomenon in many of the low-income economies 
and support for industrial development is required much more, the amount of 
subsidies/support necessary for the survival of the poor and the industries through 
budgetary allocations is a major challenge for these economies to meet. 
 
 
Evidence on the Efficiency of the public vs private enterprises and the 
implications for poverty 
 
The link between growth and efficiency is obvious. How the latter may come 
about is less than obvious. Although the advocates of privatization would argue that the 
form of ownership makes a difference, the empirical evaluation of the relationship 
between enterprise efficiency and ownership is fraught with enormous difficulties. This is 
partly due to the differences in the objectives of enterprises under private and public 
ownership.  
Millward (1988) indicated, for instance, that the empirical evidence is in no way 
uniformly support the view that private enterprises are more efficient than public 
enterprises. Indeed, both the cross-country and single country studies on privatisation 
and performance reveal mixed results. For instance, Megginson, Nash and van 
Randenborgh (1994) find that the financial performance of the 61 companies from 18 
countries improved after privatisation though the improvement was found to be 
insignificant and far less smaller for non-competitive companies. Another cross-country 
study by Cook and Uchida (2001), on the other hand, has shown that privatisation had a 
negative impact on economic growth. The econometric evidence presented by Bhaskar 
and Khan (1995) for the case of Bangladesh also disclose a negative association 
between the output level and privatisation in the 1980s. Mixed evidence on the impact of 
privatisation on efficiency and economic growth did not slow down the process of 
privatisation in many countries. In fact, in some countries, privatisation was carried out in 
spite of the evidence in the opposite direction as indicated by Millward (1988).  
How does the experience of Bangladesh fit into the overall picture of privatisation 
in developing economies? Financial weaknesses of SOEs have been well documented 
                                                                                                                                                 
gas sales. 
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in Bangladesh. They have been shown to be heavily reliant on state equity injections 
and credits (See, for instance, Akram 1999, World Bank 1995). This is especially true for 
corporations operating in manufacturing industry. Financial troubles of non-financial 
SOEs seem to have become more pronounced after the mid 1980s. Since then, not a 
single year has seen profits in their overall balance sheets. Their losses were around 2.5 
per cent of total gross industrial output between 1986-1996. 
However, three surveys that were carried out in the past reveal some crucial  firm 
level evidence with respect to the impact of privatisation on efficiency. The first was a 
survey conducted by Board of Investment in 1991. It revealed that 53 per cent of the 
privatized companies were either shut down or dysfunctional. Those that were still 
operational were not performing in a superior way in any sense.14 The second study 
was carried out by Sobhan & Mahmood (1991) which compared the performance of 
denationalised Jute and textile mills during 1981-85 (in terms of output growth, volume 
and quantity based factor productivities, wastage etc.) with those that were publicly 
owned.  The findings of this study indicated that production in the privatised jute mills 
had declined since denationalisation. Machine productivity and wastage has been 
notably poorer in the denationalised mills. The overall evidence in this study leads 
authors to rule out the argument for increased efficiency and profitability after 
privatisation. Finally, the findings of Sen’s (1997) survey covering 205 firms privatized 
during 1980s and 1990s depicted a similar picture. The closure rate is found to be 40 per 
cent, with 55 per cent of the divested firms being reported as operational.15 On the other 
hand, he finds that the profitability of the enterprises in operation increased after 
privatisation. These, when considered in addition to Akram’s (1999) findings on high 
levels of indebtedness and loan defaults among privatized firms, raise serious questions 
about the degree to which privatisation can be regarded as a panacea for efficiency. 
To sum up the discussion, when efficiency is measured by a financial indicator 
(e.g. profitability), the incidence of poor performance in the public sector is, generally, 
higher. If efficiency is measured by a more technical criteria (e.g. quantity per machine, 
industrial sickness, survival in the market), then the existing indicators and research 
suggest, in no way, an unambigous improvement in efficiency after privatisation. The 
experience in Bangladesh is unique in the sense that despite sizeable labour 
redundancies, the performance of the privatised enterprises did not seem to have 
                                                 
14 Reported in Rahman (1991, p. 206)  
15 Akram (2000) suggested Sen’s survey would indicate a 28 per cent closure/exit rate if ‘the term closure’ 
is modified to take into account different forms of closure (e.g. liquidation, inactivity).  In any case, the 
closure rate is much more than marginal. 
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improved in a significant way as indicated by the results of the three surveys discussed 
above.16  
There is another issue which require further attention. How should we re-interpret 
the high closure rates among privatised enterprises and unimpressive productivity 
performance within the context of poverty reduction? May this evidence suggest that 
there are certain structural features of the Bangladesh economy that inhibit the viability 
of privatised enterprises with certain characteristics as much as the public enterprises in 
the same sectors (e.g. drawbacks in the institutional structure, old technology, 
indebtedness, persistent decline in the world demand as for jute products, high power 
failure rates, lack of infrastructure, competition from abroad, lack of skills). In fact, the 
divestment outcomes in low-income countries like Bangladesh can be fundamentally 
different from those in the middle income economies. This question has critical 
importance which is beyond the scope of this paper as it requires further research and 
analysis. In fact, there is only one cross-country study, as far as I am aware of, by 
Boukbari and Cosset (1998) which examines the performance of enterprises in the 
middle and low-income economies together with a number of other issues. The study 
finds that there is a considerable disparity between middle income and low-income 
economies with respect to the efficiency of the firms after privatisation. According to their 
estimations, efficiency in divested firms in the middle-income economies has been quite 
favourable while the same did not apply to the firms in the low-income economies.  
The direct impact of these closures on poverty would be related to the loss of 
employment income for households affected by closures and loss of income for the input 
suppliers of the respective firms. Although one can safely argue that these 
developments have had negative impact on households and were very likely to have 
increased the poverty level, even if marginally, it is impossible to make a precise 
judgement about the scale of the impact on poverty due to lack of information about the 
characteristics of households affected. Reduced wage bill and contraction of economic 
activities as a result of closures may have influenced poverty levels further in a negative 
manner.  
 
                                                 
16 Employment cuts have often been found as the main explanatory factor for rising profitability after 
divestment. See, for instance La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) and Kikeri (1998) on this. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The experience of Bangladesh with respect to privatization and its implications 
for social welfare is full of lessons for developing countries, especially for those of low-
income status.  This study highlights a number of dimensions of privatisation because of 
their implications for poverty reduction. First of all, the employment cost associated with 
labour force restructuring in the process of privatization can be larger than the immediate 
benefits, if any, of privatization. Retrenchment is the worst form of labour restructuring in 
countries like Bangladesh where social security and health services are mostly work-
related entitlements and not provided universally. The implied cost to workers with 
limited prospects to re-enter labour market for various reasons (e.g. old age, constraints 
on mobility, lack of employment opportunities) can be enormous and no gratuity package 
can be sufficient in compensating their (and their dependants’) losses.  
Secondly, the primary objective of privatization policy of Bangladesh (e.g. use of 
divestment revenues for social/human development) has not been realised. Despite the 
high expectations expressed in official documents with respect to revenue generation 
through divestment, the likelihood of its imposing substantial burden to the society is 
very strong once all the relevant costs of divestment are taken into account. 
Finally, the mildest interpretation of the evidence with respect to efficiency in the 
case of Bangladesh would be that the divestments did not fulfil the expectations. Two 
issues are important to mention. The losses incurred, because of the semi-fiscal role that 
SOEs were expected to play (as in the case of subsidies), must be separated from 
losses arising due to technical or economic inefficiencies of SOEs. To the extent that 
losses of SOEs contribute more to the sectoral development (both public and private) 
and well being of the poor, they may be tolerated. However, if there is no such 
justification then the rationalisation of the pricing or employment strategies adopted is 
the first option to consider for improving the financial performance of SOEs in 
Bangladesh. The other issue is the extent to which inefficiency is associated with 
structural factors prevailing in the low-income countries. The evidence of high number of 
closures among divested enterprises in Bangladesh is a strong indication of the effect of 
such factors. However, this is a matter that requires further research and analysis.   
The evaluation of effects of privatisation, in this paper, has been limited with 
efficiency, employment and revenue generation. An important aspect, which is not 
tackled here, is the change in the prices and quality of as well as the access to goods 
and services produced by enterprises after their divestment. An analysis of privatisation 
in this respect may yield crucial results relevant for policy making in Bangladesh. 
 17
REFERENCES 
 
Ahmed, S. (1998) “Bureaucrats in Business (BIB): A review”, in Reform of Stated Owned 
Enterprises and Privatisation, R. Sobhan, M. M. Akash, T. Akram (eds.), Centre for 
Policy Dialogue (CPD) Monograph, No. 2 on Governance and Development 
Akash, M. M. (1998) “Bureaucrats in Business (BIB): A review”, in Reform of Stated 
Owned Enterprises and Privatisation, R. Sobhan, M. M. Akash, T. Akram (eds.), 
Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) Monograph, No. 2 on Governance and 
Development 
Akram, T.  (2000) “Entry, Exit, Efficiency and the Question of Privatisation: The Case of 
Bangladesh” in The Bangladesh Development Studies, Vol. XXVI, No.1 
Akram, T. (1999) “Public Enterprise Inefficiency and the Road to Privatisation in 
Bangladesh”, Journal Of Bangladesh Studies, Vol 1, No.1 
Basu, P. K. (1994) “Demystifying Privatisation in Developing Countries” International 
Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 44-55 
Bayliss, K. and Fine, B. (1998) “Beyond Bureaucrats in Business: A Critical Review of 
the World Bank Approach to Privatisation and Public Sector Reform” Journal of 
International Development, Vol. 10, No. 7, pp. 841-855 
Birdsall, N. and J. Nellis (2002) “Winners and Loosers: Assessing the Distributional 
Impact of Privatisation”, Working Paper, No. 6, Centre for Global Development 
BDF (2002) Public Expenditure Review, Bangladesh Development Forum (BDF) 
Bhaskar, V and Khan, Mushtaq, M. (1995) “Privatisation and Employment: A Study of 
the Jute Industry in Bangladesh” in The American Economic Review, Vol. 85, No.1, 
pp. 267-73 
Bhattacharya, D. and Titumir, R. A. M. (eds.) (2001) Stakeholders’ Perceptions: Reforms 
and Consequences, Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative, Dhaka: 
Shraban Prokashoni 
Boubakri, N. and Cosset, J. C. (1998) “The Financial and Operating Performance of 
Newly Privatised Firms: Evidence from Developing Countries” in The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. LIII, No. 3, June 1998 
Chenery, H; M. S. Ahluwalia, C. L. G. Bell, J. H. Duloy and R. Jolly (1974); Redistribution 
with Growth Great Britain: Oxford University Press 
Chisari, O.; Estache, A. and Romero, C. (1997) “Winners and Losers from Utility 
Privatisation in Argentina: Lessons from a General Equilibrium Model” World Bank 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/regulation/pubs/1824winnerslosers.html  
Commander, S. and Killick, T. (1988). “Privatisation in developing countries: a survey of 
the issues”, in Paul Cook and Colin Kirkpatrick, eds., Privatisation in Less Developed 
Countries. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.  
Cook, P and Uchida, Y. (2001) “Privatisation And Economic Growth In Developing 
Countries” Centre on Regulation and Competition, Working Paper Series, No. 7  
 18
Cook, P. and Kirkpatrick, C. (1995) “The Distributional Impact of Privatisation in 
Developing Countries” in Privatisation and Equity, V.V. Ramanadham (ed.), London: 
Routledge  
Dagdeviren, H.; R. van der Hoeven and J. Weeks (2002) “Poverty Reduction with 
Growth and Redistribution” in Development and Change, Vol. 33 (3) 
Dhameja, N. and K. S. Sastry (2002) Public Sector Restructuring and Privatisation, New 
Delhi: Kanishka Publishers 
Goyal, S. K. (2000) “Privatisation in India” in Privatisation in South Asia, G. Joshi (ed.), 
New Delhi: ILO 
Humphrey, C. L. (1990) Privatisation in Bangladesh: Economic Transition in a Poor 
Country, Westview Press 
ILO (1999) “Retraining and Redeployment of Workers Affected by Privatisation in 
Bangladesh”, Geneva: International Labour Office 
Islam, M. Faizul (1999) “The Emergence of Market Oriented Reforms in Bangladesh: A 
Critical Appraisal” in Journal of Bangladesh Studies, Vol. 1, No.1 
Joshi, G. (2000) “Overview of Privatisation in South Asia” in Privatisation in South Asia, 
G. Joshi (ed.), New Delhi: ILO 
Kikeri, S. (1998) “Privatisation and Labor –What happens to workers when governments 
divest?”, World Bank Technical Papers No. 396, February 1998 
La Porta, Rafael and Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999. “The benefits of privatization: 
evidence from Mexico”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXIV(4): 1193-1242. 
Luther, M. M. (1998) Public Sector Reforms – Myths and Realities, Har-Annad 
Publications 
Macedo, R. (2000) “Privatisation and the Distribution of Assets and Income in Brazil”, 
Working Papers, No.14, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
Sobhan, R. and Mahmood, S. A. (1991) “The Economic Performance of Denationalised 
Industries in Bangladesh: The Case of the Jute and Cotton Textile Industries”, BIDS 
Research Report, No. 129 
Megginson, William L., Robert C. Nash and Matthias van Randenborgh, 1994. “The 
financial and operating performance of newly privatized firms: an international 
empirical analysis”. The Journal of Finance, 49 (12): 403-52. 
Millward, R. (1988) “Measured Sources of Inefficiency in the Performance of Private and 
Public Enterprises in LDCs” in Paul Cook and Colin Kirkpatrick, eds., Privatisation in 
Less Developed Countries, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Ministry of Disinvestment, Annual Report – 2001-2002, Government of India 
Mishra, R. K.; P. Geeta, B. Navin (2003) Privatisation – Evolution of Indian Thought, 
New Delhi: Anmol Publications 
Paredes, M. Ricardo (2001) “Redistributive Impact of Privatisation and Regulation of 
Utilities in Chile”, WIDER Discussion Paper, WDP-2001/9 
Ramanadham, V. V. (1995) “The Impacts of Privatisation on Distributional Equity” in 
Privatisation and Equity, V.V. Ramanadham (ed.), pp. 1-34, London: Routledge 
 19
Ravallion, M. (2001) “Growth, Inequality, and Poverty: Looking beyond Averages”, World 
Bank Working Papers 
Sen, B. (1991) “Privatisation in Bangladesh: Process, Dynamics and Implications” in 
Privatisation –Trends and Experiences in South Asia, V. Kanesalingam (Ed.), Papers 
presented at a seminar organised by The Committee on Studies for Cooperation in 
Development in South Asia, Delhi: Macmillan India Ltd  
Sen, B. (1997) “Whither Privatisation: Results of An Exploratory Survey of the 
Disinvested Industries in Bangladesh” Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, 
mimeo 
Sobhan, Rehman (1991) “An Industrial Strategy for Industrial Policy: Redirecting the 
Industrial Development of Bangladesh in the 1990s”, The Bangladesh Development 
Studies, Vol. XIX, March-June 1991, No. 1-2 
Stiglitz, J. (2002) Globalisation and its Discontents, England: Penguin Books 
Van der Hoeven, R. and Sziraczki, G. (1997) Lessons from Privatisation: Labour Issues 
in Developing and Transitional Countries, Geneva: International Labour Office 
Venkataratnam, C. S. “Adjustment and privatisation in India” in Lessons from 
Privatisation, R. van der Hoeven and G. Sziraczki (eds.), Geneva: International 
Labour Office 
World Bank (1995) Bangladesh: From Stabilization to Growth, A World Bank Country 
Study, Washington, D.C: World Bank. 
 
 
 
 
